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Abstract Stakeholder involvement in design is desirable from both a practical and
an ethical point of view. It is difficult to do well, however, and some problems recur
again and again, both of a practical nature, e.g. stakeholders acting strategically
rather than openly, and of an ethical nature, e.g. power imbalances unduly affecting
the outcome of the process. Hidden Design has been proposed as a method to deal
with the practical problems of stakeholder involvement. It aims to do so by taking
the observation of stakeholder actions, rather than the outcomes of a deliberative
process, as its input. Furthermore, it hides from stakeholders the fact that a design
process is taking place so that they will not behave differently than they otherwise
would. Both aspects of Hidden Design have raised ethical worries. In this paper I
make an ethical analysis of what it means for a design process to leave participants
uninformed or deceived rather than acquiring their informed consent beforehand,
and to use observation of actions rather than deliberation as input for design, using
Hidden Design as a case study. This analysis is based on two sets of normative
guidelines: the ethical guidelines for psychological research involving deception or
uninformed participants from two professional psychological organisations, and
Habermasian norms for a fair and just (deliberative) process. It supports the con-
clusion that stakeholder involvement in design organised in this way can be ethi-
cally acceptable, though under a number of conditions and constraints.
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Stakeholder involvement in design is as crucial as it is tricky for both practical
success and ethical justification. Concerning practical success, the more designers
know about what their users actually want, the more chance they have of designing
something that will actually be used. Concerning ethical justification, if a new
technology affects stakeholders, those stakeholders should have a say in its design
and implementation, especially if the technology or its implementation might
subject them to harms, risks or unknown hazards. Besides, stakeholders may well
and justifiedly protest against, oppose or boycott a technology that they feel affects
them negatively and has been ‘pushed through’ without their consent. These
considerations have led to the development of all kinds of design methods and
innovation paradigms that promote stakeholder involvement such as constructive
technology assessment (Schot and Rip 1997), co-design (Pralahad and Ramaswamy
2004), participatory design (Clement and van den Besselaar 1993; Steen 2011),
value-sensitive design (Friedman et al. 2005) and responsible innovation (Stilgoe
et al. 2013).
Meaningful stakeholder involvement is not easy, however. Regarding the
practical side, most stakeholders are not designers themselves. Thus, their imput
may not always yield insights that are straightforwardly translatable into design
specifications (e.g. Tomico et al. 2012). They may act strategically to advance their
interests, which may not always contribute to a socially accepted product (Blok
2014). And what stakeholders claim to desire in a product may not always be
aligned with their actual behaviour regarding that product, for various reasons:
unconscious biases, force of habit, cost-competitiveness, etc.
Regarding the ethical side, participation in the design process is difficult to get
right as well. Pre-set problem framings and power imbalances are unavoidable and
even necessary to start a discussion, but can exclude or marginalise stakeholder
voices if not handled properly (Torgersen and Schmidt 2013; Blok 2014). The
ethical requirement to be as inclusive as possible and include a diversity of voices
tends to be in tension with the practical requirement to deliver a finished product
with limited resources and within a limited time period (Bovenkerk 2012, Ch, 3;
Steen 2011). And even if a technology becomes accepted by all stakeholders
involved, it does not automatically follow that it is ethically acceptable (Manders-
Huits 2010), e.g. it might violate human rights or stakeholders might have been
threatened or cajoled into accepting it.
Recently ‘Hidden Design’ has been proposed as an alternative approach to
stakeholder involvement in design (Afdeling Buitengewone Zaken (ABZ) 2013).
The developers of this method argue that all practical shortcomings mentioned
emerge from the way in which stakeholder involvement is commonly given form. In
all the design methods mentioned above, stakeholder participation takes the form of
deliberation. Stakeholders are interviewed, brought together in focus groups and
express desires for and opinions and criticism of designer proposals. In contrast,
Hidden Design claims that designers should study stakeholder participation in the
form of action: how do they actually interact (or not interact) with a particular
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technology? Hidden Design’s reasons for this are similar to those of social
psychologists who prefer to study human behaviour in natural settings rather than in
a controlled lab. It is common knowledge in psychology that humans exhibit all
sorts of biases in their reasoning and behaviour that they do not endorse consciously
or may even deny having (e.g. Doris 2002). Thus, psychologists studying human
behaviour cannot (only) do so by handing out questionnaires: they have to ‘hide’
experiments or present test subjects with false information on what the test is about,
so they can study ‘natural’ rather than controlled, self-conscious behaviour. Hidden
Design aims to do something similar: it ‘hides’ the design process, suggesting that
users try out a finished product (or service) where the product is in fact continually
being (re)designed on the basis of user (non-)interaction. In this way, the influence
of the mere presence of the designer (and in psychological experiments, that of the
researcher) on human behaviour is minimised. This helps circumvent many
practical problems of stakeholder involvement. Stakeholders will not act strategi-
cally because they are not aware of having influence on a design process; only their
actual behaviour, not what they claim they will do, is input for the design process;
and observations of (non-)interaction are more helpful for suggesting design
specifications than deliberation. The Hidden Design researchers tend to emphasize
this last point with a quote from Henry Ford: ‘‘If I had asked people what they
wanted, they would have said faster horses.’’
Hidden Design has been developed as an answer to the practical problems of
stakeholder involvement in design. However, so far the Hidden Design researchers
have not investigated how their method scores with regard to the ethical aspects of
stakeholder involvement. This is especially important as it is crucial to their method
that subjects are unware of, or even misled about, the role they play in the design
process and how data about their behaviour is being collected and used. Of course,
Hidden Design is not unique in this: surreptitious data-gathering and redesign of
sold products through updates (e.g. software) occurs regularly. My aim in this paper
is to investigate whether, and if so, under what conditions, such design methods are
ethically acceptable, using Hidden Design as a case study.
The paper is structured in the following way. In the ‘‘Hidden Design’’ section I
explain the aim of Hidden Design and the way its design process works. In ‘‘Design
Evaluated as a Psychological Experiment’’ I make a comparison between
experiments in design and ‘hidden’ psychological experiments to investigate under
which circumstances it is allowed to engage in experimental research of which
subjects are unaware or deceived about. I will use the guidelines for ethical
experimentation here from two professional psychological organisations: the APA
(American Psychological Association) and the BPS (British Psychological Society).
In ‘‘Design Evaluated as a Procedure for Settling Community Affairs’’ I
conceptualise technology design as a way of settling community affairs and
evaluate it from the angle of procedural ethics, to see to which degree observation
and action can (ethically) replace a deliberative process. For this I will draw on
normative guidelines from Habermas for a fair deliberative process. In the ‘‘General
Conclusion and Recommendations’’ section I draw my conclusions and end with
recommendations on how and under which circumstances stakeholder involvement
organised in this way can be ethically acceptable. Most important of these are that
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deception should never be a first option, as it would reflect badly upon the
profession of designers at large; that subjects should not be exposed to risks or
harms that they do not consent to as part of everyday life; and that it can only be
done if the technology’s effects are to a high degree reversible so that design
decisions can be effectively and legitimately challenged by community members
during the design process.
Hidden Design
Hidden Design is a high-level framework for design: it is more concerned with the
overall goals of design and its method of stakeholder involvement than with the
nitty–gritty details of actual product design.1 The goal of Hidden Design is to
achieve a particular societal goal or effect: the measure of success is ‘to what extent
the lives of the people we design for change towards the project’s goal’. (ABZ 2013,
p. 3). This goal implies an unusual focus of the Hidden Design method that brings it
closer to persuasive technology (Fogg 2003) than to product design: where many
design methods focus on designing functional technical artefacts, Hidden Design
aims at creating particular socio-technical systems where technical functioning and
human behaviour combine to achieve the desired goals or effects. At the same time,
it realises that such systems (unlike technical artefacts) cannot be designed top-
down, they have to emerge from a particular configuration of technology,
stakeholders and institutions. What Hidden Design thus does is introduce a
particular technology and (re)design it, using stakeholder interaction as its input,
until a desired socio-technical system emerges.
Hidden Design consists of six steps that are applied in iteration until the desired
socio-technical system has emerged or it has otherwise been decided that the design
process should stop (Fig. 1). It starts with the definition of a project goal and
identification of strategies that might lead to that goal (step one). From this, a
technical protoype is developed together with an intervention scenario: what roles
will the designers play in order to introduce their prototype in a community (step
two)? The prototype is then marketed or introduced in the community by the
designers as if it were a finished product or professional service in step three, the
intervention stage. The method stresses the importance of making the intended users
believe that they are dealing with an actual product or service, not an experiment,
hence the development of an intervention scenario beforehand. This is so that the
intended users will not behave strategically, try to please the designers but abandon
the technology later on, or conversely, boycott the technology for reasons having
nothing to do with usability. Of course, the technology is not a finished product: the
designers continually provide the services the technology cannot yet provide and
redesign the prototype ‘behind the scenes’ with the aim of gradually designing
themselves out of the system (ABZ 2013). This is done by monitoring responses to
the technology (step four) and quickly adapting the technology to user behaviour as
needed (step five). Finally, the results of all these steps are reflected upon in step six,
1 It can, of course, be combined with design approaches that focus on the product design level..
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which leads to reconsideration of goals and strategies, starting a new cycle in the
design process.
Ideally, after some time the desired socio-technical system has emerged and
development of the technology has finished, at which point the designers can
transfer the managerial tasks for the technology to an entrepreneur or managing
institution. Several applications of Hidden Design have for example been the
electrification of villages in rural India (Tomico et al. 2012) and connecting small
local retailers better to their customers through digital technology in a Belgian
village (ABZ 2013).
Design Evaluated as a Psychological Experiment
As mentioned above, the Hidden Design method has not been ethically evaluated
yet. This is problematic since at its core is the need to deceive potential users about
the aims of the project and the status of the technology, in order to elicit ‘natural
behaviour’. However, for experiments and interventions in many fields (as well as
for deontological ethics) the gold standard for ethical acceptability is informed
consent: if you are going to do something that affects people, then those people have
to be informed and have to actively consent to the intervention in order to make it
ethically acceptable. One prominent engineering ethics code, the US National
Society of Professional Engineers’ Code of Ethics even explicitly forbids deceptive
acts, though this is particularly aimed against bribery and presenting false
qualifications.2
What does this mean for the ethical acceptability of Hidden Design? In the
following two sections I evaluate Hidden Design from two perspectives. In this
section, I evaluate design as a social experiment, whereas in ‘‘Design Evaluated as a
Procedure for Settling Community Affairs’’ I evaluate it as a replacement for
deliberation in procedural ethics.
Fig. 1 The Hidden Design method
2 Rule II, clause 5. See http://www.nspe.org/resources/ethics/code-ethics. Accessed 10 March 2016.
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Regarding design as a social experiment is helpful for two reasons. First, the
introduction of new technologies in society has been conceptualised as a social
experiment before, and this conceptualisation has led to practical recommendations
(e.g. Jacobs et al. 2010). Second, particularly in social psychology researchers have
encountered much the same problem as Hidden Design does: people will often
behave differently in experimental than in natural settings, so studying natural
behaviour sometimes means deceiving them with regard to the fact that an
experiment is going on—or with regard to the purposes of the experiment. This has
led to sets of ethical guidelines by influential organisations such as the APA (2010)
and the BPS (2014) on when such experiments are acceptable. I now turn to these
guidelines to see if, and if so, how they could be applied to Hidden Design.
The APA and BPS guidelines both distinguish between two kinds of situations:
those where people remain uninformed about an experiment and its purposes, and
those where they are actively misinformed or deceived. Since Hidden Design
combines elements of both, I will treat each of them in turn.
Dealing with Uninformed Participants
Much of research in social psychology as well as in sociology (e.g. ethnographic
research) consists of observing people’s behaviour in particular settings. Generally,
codes of ethics allow for this without requiring informed consent, if the observations
are made in a public place in which people know they may be observed. The APA
adds that any photos made and voices recorded may not be used for personal
identification or harm (standard 8.03). It also allows observation without informed
consent in a number of specific non-public circumstances (educational or
organizational studies; anonymous questionnaires dealing with non-sensitive data;
if otherwise permitted by local law) (standard 8.05). The BPS adds that studies
based on observations in natural settings should respect the privacy and
psychological wellbeing of the participants (Section 7). Extra attention is needed
if people think they are not being observed, or when local cultural values may differ
from those of the researchers. For this last situation, McLeod (2015) recommends
asking representatives of local cultural groups beforehand whether they would
expect the research to cause distress: this would be a form of getting informed
consent by proxy. He also suggests more generally that research is acceptable as
long as it doesn’t do anything to participants that couldn’t happen to them in real
life, and places them at no greater risk of harm than they experience in real life. In
other words, research that participants would consent to if they would be informed
about it (hypothetical consent).
Translated to ethical guidelines for designers, this would imply that observations
and interventions may be done in real life without informing participants about the
design process if these observations and interventions are done in public places and
could also happen in real-life situations, e.g. as part of a marketing or product
promotion campaign. However, designers should respect the privacy and psycho-
logical wellbeing of the participants; make sure that data they collect cannot be used
for personal identification or harmful purposes; and that the designers take local
cultural values into account if they operate in alien settings.
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Designing for different cultures, particularly developing countries, is a field of its
own and requires attention to many dimensions of difference (Best and Smyth 2011;
see also e.g. Macnaghten et al. 2014; Kroesen et al. 2015). I will make a few
recommendations here for taking local values into account. A first step would be to
approach local communities with sensitivity, attention and compassion (Rahnema
2010) which may require ‘unlearning’ of personal framings and values regarding
how people should live their life (Nieusma and Riley 2010, see also the subsection
‘‘Problem Framings in Design’’ on dealing with problem framings.) Designers
should also keep in mind the difference between substantive values such as privacy
and autonomy, the relevance of which can be discovered during a fair and just
design process, and procedural values, such as exclusion of particular groups from
or tolerance of violence in the decision-making process, which can threaten a just
and fair design process. The good news for Hidden Design is that one of the more
common cultural difficulties encountered by designers is the unwillingness of
stakeholders to outright criticise or ‘disappoint’ them during a formal procedure
(Best and Smyth 2011), and Hidden Design evades this by offering stakeholders the
opportunity to do so in a more informal, action-oriented way.
One final remark should be made regarding the risk of harm in real life, bearing
in mind the case study regarding electrification of villages in rural India. It may be
that designers operate in situations where the risk of harm in real life is already
greater for some groups than would be morally acceptable (e.g. due to food
insecurity, armed conflicts or other threats to basic human needs), or where the law
permits observations and interventions that are ethically questionable. In such cases,
it seems reasonable to require that designers work proactively to minimise the risk
of harm for those groups through their interventions. More generally, as the BPS
states in its (2009) Code of Ethics and Conduct, ‘no Code can replace the need for
psychologists to use their professional and ethical judgment’ (p. 4) and ‘thinking is
not optional’ (p. 5). There seems to be no reason why this important disclaimer
would not hold for designers performing technical experiments within society as
well.
Dealing with Deceived Participants
Performing an experiment without informing participants is a different matter from
actively deceiving those participants about what is going on. Unsurprisingly,
psychologists have argued that the case for active deception in experiments is
generally more difficult to make than that for simply not giving information.3
McLeod (2015) argues that there are at least three good considerations against using
deception in psychological experiments: it is a violation of individuals’ rights to
choose for or against participation; it is hardly a ‘healthy’ base for a professional
discipline; and it can lead to distrust of professionals in that discipline. All three
considerations seem applicable to design as well and should thus be taken into
3 Not giving information is generally, but not always morally better than deception. For example, an
experiment in which participants are not informed about the fact that the experimenter will cover them in
poisonous spiders is more problematic than one in which the experimenter tells participants that they are
interested in speed of letter recognition, while the experimenter really measures accuracy.
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consideration by methods such as Hidden Design when considering deception. (This
does not imply that deception is never allowed; rather that there are good reasons
against implementing it that go beyond particular cases and affect design as a
discipline).
For these reasons, both the APA and the BPS take a ‘no, unless’ stance with
regard to deception. The APA states that deception should not occur unless it can be
justified by the significant expected value of the research and alternative procedures
without deception are not feasible (standard 8.07). The BPS agrees with the APA on
these points and adds that there should be ‘an appropriate risk management and
harm alleviation strategy’ (Section 7). The APA simply forbids deception if the
researchers can reasonably expect that their research will cause physical pain or
serious emotional distress (standard 8.07). In addition, the BPS requires an ethics
review to take place of the proposed research and McLeod (2015) recommends
approval by an independent expert.
Finally, all three sources stress the importance of debriefings of participants if
deception is involved. McLeod (2015) gives the following arguments for this: the
debriefing can take away uncertainty or misguided ideas among participants about
what the researchers were about; it can give them the feeling that they have
contributed to something useful; and it allows participants to withdraw their data
from the study and thus reinstate their right of choice to participate to some degree
(informed consent about data use). The APA adds that debriefings are a good way to
check if participants have suffered no distress (standard 8.08); the BPS remarks that
if hearing of the deception were to make participants angry or distressed, then the
experiment should not have taken place (Section 7).
What does this mean for design? Following the recommendations by the APA
and BPS would lead to a ‘no, unless’, stance, where methods such as Hidden Design
would never be the first choice of stakeholder involvement, and its implementation
would need justification on two grounds. The first would be that alternative design
procedures are not feasible in that situation. In fact, this is what happened in the
rural Indian case study, where Hidden Design was only applied after other
procedures failed (Tomico et al. 2012). The second ground would be that the
deception should lead to significant added value—maybe not in terms of scientific
insights, though some design insights could be more broadly applicable, but rather
in terms of the societal value of the new socio-technical system.
An issue left for designers to consider is that of the distribution of added societal
value. The APA and the BPS say nothing about who should be able to benefit from
those psychological insights and how this clause applies to researchers (or in our
case, designers) engaging in experiments for the benefit of a private company rather
than a public institution. Most theories of justice would require at least that those
who bear the risks or ‘burdens’ of the research should be able to reap its benefits or
get compensation for participating.4 Constraint on these conditions would be that
designers should not engage in deception if they reasonably can expect it to result in
physical pain or serious emotional distress; that they should draw up a risk
4 For a more in-depth discussion of issues arising in the distribution of risks and benefits, see Hansson
(2003).
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management and harm mitigation strategy; and that peer review of the design plans
by an independent expert from the design community is advisable.
A final consideration is that of debriefings. These might be less important in
design than in a psychological experiment: taking away uncertainty or misguided
ideas among the participants of what the design project was about should not be
applicable, as the design experiment is always about creating a particular socio-
technical system that should have become part of the everyday life of the
participants at the end. Moreover, unlike psychological experiments that (ideally)
start with clearly formulated hypotheses, the goals of Hidden Design are flexible
and their practical implementation is partly determined by the behaviour of the
participants themselves. Similarly, the resulting socio-technical system should make
clear to the participants that they have contributed to something useful by
(unwittingly) contributing to design research. Designers should take note that, if the
design project fails in the sense that no desired socio-technical system emerges,
these points remain unaddressed. Therefore, resources should be allocated in
advance to making a debriefing possible in case the design project fails. Finally,
debriefings could be useful to establish the right of participants to withdraw their
data (recordings, videos, photos, designer notes etc.—that in any case should be
anonymised or otherwise treated to exclude the possibility of personal identification
or personal harm, as per the APA standard 8.03) from the research project and thus
compensate for the lack of informed consent to some degree. A debriefing could
also be useful for checking whether the design project has caused any distress.
In conclusion, treating design like a psychological experiment teaches us that not
informing participants or even deceiving them is not necessarily morally problem-
atic, though ethically seen, not informing always takes preference over active
deception, and informed consent always takes preference over not informing. On a
general level deception should never be a first choice of method and always requires
justification. Also, it requires a vision of how deceptive methods will affect design
as a discipline and the image of designers among the general public, as well as a
strategy for compensation for not obtaining informed consent.
While direct informed consent could (allegedly) counter the practically useful
effects of non-information and deception, it is clear that there are various ways in
which respect for the autonomy and privacy of the participants can still be upheld if
informed consent is not sought. Methods include consulting representatives of local
cultural groups whether they would consent to the research (consent by proxy), a
commitment to not expose participants to risks or harms that they do not already
accept as part of everyday life (obtaining hypothetical consent; consent that
participants would have given if they had been asked) and debriefings in which
participants are asked whether they have experienced distress (if so, they should be
compensated) and are offered the opportunity to withdraw their personal data from
the project (obtaining informed consent about data use). A final possibility is that
people may give their informed consent to goals and (kinds of) interventions
through the political process: if a community democratically decides that particular
interventions are allowed (e.g. the government using persuasive technologies to
promote sustainable behaviour), obtaining individual informed consent about these
interventions would no longer be necessary. Of course, whether this holds depends
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on the quality of the democratic process and whether there is indeed a clear and
identifiable community: this last issue will be addressed in more detail in the
subsection ‘‘Community Decision-Making’’.
Design Evaluated as a Procedure for Settling Community Affairs
In the previous section I have conceptualised design as a social experiment
involving not informing or deceiving participants, and drawn a parallel between
design and psychological experiments involving deception. In this section I take a
different angle: conceptualising design as a procedure for settling affairs within a
community.
The conceptualisation of technology as a way to settle affairs within a
community is a classical one (Winner 1980): simple examples are those of
installing a speed bump to discourage reckless driving, or installing a smart grid in a
rural Indian village to alleviate energy poverty. The ethical advantage of such a
conceptualisation is that it can draw for its evaluation on a strong tradition in ethics,
namely that of procedural justice. Procedural justice is not (contrary to substantive
ethical approaches) concerned with what action should be done or what outcome
should be achieved, but with what procedure a community consisting of diverse
individuals can settle its affairs in a fair and just way (e.g. Habermas 1984; 1987;
1990).5 Theories of procedural justice have been an inspiration for design methods
such as participatory design (Steen 2011), value-sensitive design (Yetim 2011) and
responsible innovation (Stilgoe et al. 2013).
Unfortunately—for our purposes, at least—procedural ethics focuses on debate
and deliberation, where Hidden Design works primarily through observation and
action. (Though the designers may talk to people involved, they never present
themselves as designers.) This means that established norms for fair deliberation
cannot straightforwardly be applied to Hidden Design, but have to be ‘translated’.
As a full, philosophically grounded translation would take us too far afield in this
paper, I will rather sketch a rough draft of what such a translation would look like
and what it would say about Hidden Design. Particularly, this sketch looks at the
ultimate aim of procedural justice and problem framings, interest groups and how to
demarcate a community, and norms for the logical, dialectical and rhetorical levels
of discourse.
Problem Framings in Design
With regard to the ultimate aim of procedural justice, Habermas sees this as
validating norms for action within a community, where a norm is valid when the
foreseeable consequences and side-effects from acting on it could be jointly
accepted by all concerned without coercion (Habermas 1999, 42). Interestingly,
5 Though for those who like complications, Habermas argues that his approach can be seen as an
improvement over substantive approaches founded on individual reasoning, as different individuals may
reason from different (reasonable) vantage points and thus can reach different conclusions on what is the
right thing to do.
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Hidden Design more or less subscribes to this aim, by defining their primary goals in
terms so general that they would be acceptable by anyone. For example, for the
electrification project in India the goal was ‘energy access for everyone’ (personal
communication). However, goals can be interpreted in many different ways, and
there are many different means towards each goal. Ideally, therefore, both goals and
means should be discussed interchangably (Norton 2005). In practice, however, the
main goal is often pre-defined and the problem pre-framed by the organising
stakeholder (e.g. Bovenkerk 2012). This is practically useful for focusing the debate
(and starting it in the first place) and achieving consensus, but runs the ethical risk of
excluding or marginalising those with different problem framings or goal
interpretations.
While Hidden Design has reflecting on and revisiting of its goals built into its
method, it cannot avoid working with prototypes, which embody both a problem
framing and a solution (as the speed bump and the smart grid illustrate). While this
does not make the method unethical, it does mean that designers applying Hidden
Design should be aware of the problem framing embodied in the prototype. This
implies that they should not only pay attention to who interacts with their prototype
and why, but also to participants refusing to use the prototype or boycotting it: this
may be because those participants agree with the problem framing but think the
solution problematic, or they may disagree with the problem framing altogether.
Obviously, both situations require very different interventions. Finally, it is
important for designers to keep in mind that the ultimate aim of procedural justice,
validating norms for action within a community, is slightly different from the aim of
Hidden Design, which is to achieve a particular societal goal or effect. Particularly,
even if Hidden Design is successful in realising its aim, designers cannot assume
(and should ideally check whether) all involved jointly accept the socio-technical
system without coercion. (For example, participants may feel forced into using the
system, or choose exclusion from the system because they feel their views have not
been adequately taken into consideration, and neither would be ethically desirable.)
The issue of design always embodying a problem (and solution) framing is
relevant enough to merit more treatment here. As stated before, framing is both
necessary and risky. Calvert and Warren (2014) distinguish two morally relevant
effects of framing: they affect the autonomy of our judgment (by making salient
particular aspects of the problem) and our ideas of who can or should partake in
decision-making. With regard to affecting the autonomy of our judgement, frames
can shine light on hitherto neglected aspects of a problem and can structure complex
and difficult issues (positive), or they can obscure morally relevant aspects
(negative). In design, these effects have been investigated by the theory of
mediation. For example, Verbeek (2008) investigates how obstetric ultrasound
technology allows us to perceive aspects of a fetus that we couldn’t perceive before
(such as the gender), but also ‘frames’ the baby as a person by making it appear as
larger and more independent from the mother than it actually is. With regard to who
should partake in decision-making, frames can direct our attention to parties
affected by our decisions that we hadn’t taken into account before (positive), or they
can stereotype or dismiss others as ‘irrational’ and thus unworthy of partaking in
decision-making (negative). In design, these effects have been investigated in
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inclusive design (Clarkson et al. 2003), but one could also think of design for
sustainability that takes into account the people who will be affected by technology
design long after current users will be gone.
Calvert and Warren (2014) give a number of suggestions for minimising the
chances of introducing negative framing effects. One of the most important is to
focus on the practical aspects of a problem rather than the ideology that surrounds it,
which many technology designers already do as a matter of course. Other
suggestions include making sure that everyone can participate in the debate (or in
the Hidden Design case, trying out the design.) Note that ‘equal access’ may not
always be enough: there may be barriers for participation for affected groups that
may require active effort on the part of the designers to remove them. Time should
be taken for building mutual trust and learning from parties with different framings
(this may hold between designers and users, as well between different user groups).
Other options include taking time to investigate one’s own design/framing and the
unstated assumptions that go into it, and confronting users with multiple designs
embodying different framings.
Interest Groups
With regard to the ultimate aim of procedural justice and interest groups, it is also
noteworthy that Hidden Design can help here exactly because of its ‘hidden’ nature.
Ideally, for Habermas, all participants in the deliberation share the aim of validating
norms for action within a community. However, both politics and design can be
influenced by interest groups that are not so much concerned with procedural justice
as well as with achieving their own goals as best as possible, and that do so by
‘…pressuring or cajoling policy-makers…’ and…’lobbying, buying political
advertisements, contributing funds to parties and candidates and mobilising
votes…’ (Young 2001, 674). Of course, if the design process is hidden, interest
groups will not be aware of it, and thus will not engage in these kinds of strategic
behaviours to promote their own interests.
Hiding the design process comes with several disadvantages regarding this
ultimate aim, however. One is that the deception holds equally for interest groups
out for their own gain and groups or individuals that are genuinely concerned with
community goals and values and would be willing to promote them even over their
own self-interest—if they were to know about the design procedure. Another
disadvantage is that interest groups might have very legitimate interests that are
affected by the introduction of a new technology, in which case they should be
involved in the design process, whether knowingly or unknowingly.
Community Decision-Making
A second caveat with regard to applying Habermas to technology design, one that
has received little attention in the literature so far, is that the Habermasian process
has been drawn up for community decision-making. The focus here tends to be on
people who are bound together by living in one physical place (a village, a country,
etc.), but who might have different values or interests—apart from a common
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interest in the survival and flourishing of that community. On the one hand, this
makes procedural ethics less applicable to innovation processes, where stakeholders
might be spread across the globe (e.g. Balkema and Pols 2015). Indeed, engineers
who visit a community to proclaim that an intended nuclear waste disposal site
would be perfectly safe, only to travel back to their own faraway homes afterwards,
may well be met with suspicion and hostility. On the other hand, communities can
be bound by ties other than place, and the whole point of many innovations is to
create win–win situations, in other words, to promote survival and flourishing of all
the affected stakeholders. This is not to say that engineers should necessarily create
‘innovation communities’ before they can legitimately engage in deliberative
exercises, though empathy and community involvement can certainly help (cf.
Rahnema 2010). Rather, I will assume that if living in a common geographical
location is sufficent for creating a ‘community’ to whose decision-making norms of
procedural justice apply, there is no good reason why being affected by a particular
innovation could also not be a common factor tying people together into a
‘community’ that can make decisions with regard to that innovation, so that it may
be governed by the norms of procedural justice.
Discourse Guidelines
Not just any stakeholder discussion will lead to a situation in which participants
achieve consensus over action-guiding norms. Habermas has drawn up a number of
discourse guidelines on various levels that, when followed by all, should lead to such a
consensus.6 These norms operate on three different levels: the logical, dialectical and
rhetorical level (Habermas 1990, 87–89; cf. Gilbert and Behnam 2009).
On the logical level, speakers (1) may not contradict themselves, (2) must be
consistent in applying predicates to objects and (3) may not use the same expression
with different meanings. Translated to action, (1) and (2) require consistency in
behaviour—this is actually what Hidden Design aims to achieve by deceiving
participants: if participants do not know that they are not in a ‘normal’ situation,
they have no reason not to behave as they normally do, and any changes in
behaviour should be the result of normal changes in beliefs, attitudes, etc. (3) Seems
not applicable as there is no distinction between expression and meaning in action,
though actions may of course be done (and expressions may be used) for different
reasons, and questions or interviews might be needed to find them out.
On the dialectical level, speakers (1) may only assert what they really believe and
(2) must provide a reason if they want to dispute a norm or proposition not currently
under discussion. Condition (2) is impossible to enforce if participants are unaware
of the design experiment: people may and do engage with other socio-technical
systems than that the designer seeks to design, and it seems possible that this may
interfere with designer plans. However, this is not a problem as long as participants
6 In our non-ideal world, it may sometimes be difficult to achieve consensus. In the subsection
‘‘Achieving Consensus’’ I will discuss a number of second-best options that may be implemented if
achieving consensus is in practice impossible and a decision (regarding design or otherwise) has to be
made.
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do not directly disturb the design experiment without reason. Condition (1) forbids
strategic behaviour, and this is again what Hidden Design seeks to accomplish by
deceiving participants. However, Hidden Design’s designers make an obvious
exception for themselves because of their deception.7 The rather cynical though not
unjustified reason for this is again the claim that if the designers won’t deceive the
participants (about the purpose of the experiment), the participants will likely
deceive the designers (for social or strategic reasons) and no successful design will
result. As I already went into the issue of deception at length in the previous section,
I simply note here that it is a violation of Habermasian guidelines and leave the
empirical validity of the cynical claim and the justifying power of the designers’
argument for our non-ideal world to be addressed another day.
On the rhetorical level, (1) everyone with the competence to speak and act should
be allowed to take part in the discourse, (2) everyone should be able to express
attitudes, desires needs and make any assertions whatsoever, and to question the
assertions of others, and (3) no speaker may be prevented from exercising his or her
rights through coercion. (1) and (3) should again be guaranteed through hiding the
design process, though the designers should be well aware of existing social
structures that may prevent legitimate stakeholders from participating; be aware of
the coercion that technology itself may exhibit (e.g. Winner 1980); and strive to be
as inclusive as possible in their design of the prototype so that interaction for
particular user groups is not excluded from the start (Clarkson et al. 2003).
Deliberative processes have been criticised for their inclusivity being necessarily
limited: those who cannot participate in deliberation, such as animals, young
children and future generations cannot influence the process, even though they may
have legitimate and urgent stakes in its outcome.8 On this point Hidden Design
actually has an advantage over deliberative processes, as parties such as animals that
cannot deliberate can still interact with the technology in accordance with their
interests and thus provide useful input for the design process.
A difficulty, however, lies with the requirement that everyone should be able to
question the assertions of others, and here the big advantage of a discourse situation
comes to light. For assertions do not change the world as actions do, and where an
assertion (e.g. ‘We should drill for shale gas in this municipality’, ‘We should kill
the wolves that eat our sheep’) may be freely challenged, an action (actually drilling
for shale gas in that municipality, or killing the wolves) may have irreversible
consequences that effectively constrain the action opportunities of others, including
limiting their ability to challenge or undo that action and its consequences. Indeed,
technology has been conceptualised as enforcing or suggesting particular socio-
political structures (Winner 1980) or a particular morality (Latour 1992) that, once
in place, may selectively constrain or coerce people. There is always a trade-off here
in the sense that design is both opening up and closing off options for action:
fracking technology allows us to drill for shale gas while at the same time closing
7 In contrast, it seems that deceiving participants about the fact that they are participating in a
deliberative procedure for settling community affairs would be rather more difficult.
8 Indirect representation is possible, e.g. through NGOs or ombudspersons, though its normative
legitimation remains difficult (Ekeli 2005).
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off the possibility for having a nature preserve at the same site. Hidden Design
partly compensates for potentially irreversible effects through iterative monitoring
and redesign so that changes in design can be undone if desired. However, this may
not be possible for all kinds of technologies and designers should consider in
advance whether their application of Hidden Design may have irreversible effects,
and if so, whether they would be acceptable given the value and distribution of the
potential gains, require compensation or a suitable exit strategy on the part of the
designers, etc.
Achieving Consensus
Hidden Design shares a certain optimism with Habermas, and indeed with all
participative design methods that were mentioned in the introduction: all assume
that following the process will eventually lead to a decision. For Habermas, this
means achieving consensus on how a particular issue should be settled within a
community; for Hidden Design, this means the emergence of a socio-technical
system that fits its goals. Yet deliberation is not always able to solve value
disagreements (such as in the debate on GM crops, see Bovenkerk 2012), and
likewise it seems that Hidden Design may well run into value disagreements where
no given design can appeal to two groups of stakeholders at the same time. Neither
Habermas nor Hidden Design offers an ethically justified way to balance the ethical
goal of inclusion against the practical aims of achieving consensus or a workable
socio-technical system. Suggestions by others include accepting that consensus may
not always be possible, but that by following the relevant procedure we may still
attain consensus on measures/designs, if not on underlying values (Norton 2005, Ch.
4), or that we may attain a deeper understanding of the problem and each other’s
viewpoints and keep the door open for future consensus (Gutmann and Thompson
1996; Swierstra and Rip 2007). Alternatively, we may adopt a two- or three-track
approach, where the decision-making/design track feeds on, but is not identical to,
tracks in which more fundamental problem exploration and discussion takes place
(Bovenkerk 2012, Ch. 3); or design for flexibility so that, if new factual insights
emerge or values change, the socio-technical system can easily be adapted (e.g. van
der Velden 2009; Kiran 2012; Dechesne et al. 2013).
In case these options cannot be applied and circumstances demand a decision, a
possible option is trying to achieve reflective equilibrium, where moral judgements
of stakeholders are critically reflected upon with the help of moral principles and
background theories (van de Poel and Zwart 2010). Another option is abandoning
the aim of consensus, where everyone fully agrees with with the final solution, and
allow bartering, where people may negotiate on the basis of their own self interest
(‘‘I’ll allow you X if you concede me Y’’), or a compromise, where everyone jointly
tries to work out a solution that is most acceptable for everyone, even though not
everyone will agree on all aspects of the design (Bellamy 1999). Gilbert and
Behnam (2009, 229) follow Habermas (1996) in asserting that compromises are
only acceptable as a second-best solution under three conditions: (1) the
compromise should be more advantageous to all participants than maintaining the
status quo; (2) free-riders who are unwilling to cooperate should be excluded from
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the arrangement and (3) exploited parties who contribute more to the cooperative
effort than they gain from it should also be excluded from the arrangement. These
conditions give such a compromise an advantage over a simple majority vote (e.g.
they do not allow for the exploitation of a minority). Moreover, both consensus and
compromise are at an advantage over expert judgements as a solution when dealing
with complex, ‘wicked’ problems (such as how to deal with energy poverty in rural
India), as these kinds of problems tend to go beyond the expertise of any one
specialist or designer, and are at least as much the result of value clashes as of
technical challenges (Funtowicz and Ravetz 1993).
Design as a Procedure for Settling Community Affairs: Conclusion
In conclusion it seems that the observation-and-action-oriented Hidden Design
offers an interesting alternative for deliberative procedures in design. It is able to
avoid some of deliberation’s practical problems such as strategic behaviour and
ideological clashes due to its deceptive nature, and is more inclusive since it
requires only the capability for action to participate, not the capability to deliberate.
Its ethical Achilles’ heel as a procedure for settling community affairs, however, is
that the actions (and designs) of some close off options for action and redesign of
others. This means that the designers and those who interact first are likely to have a
disproportionate impact on the design of the system compared to those who come
later, that would not be justified on moral grounds. Awareness of the problem
framing inherent in the design and the implementation of corrective mechanisms
(see the ‘‘Problem Framings in Design’’ subsection) may compensate for this. Also,
flexibility in design and continuous redesign can compensate for this to some
degree, so it depends very much on how flexible the technology is and how
irreversible the effects of its implementation are whether this is a minor or major
problem.
Finally, both deliberative and action-oriented processes share a number of ethical
weaknesses. One salient example is the situation that a problem framing is needed to
kick off the discussion/build the prototype, yet in situations where different parties
frame the problem in different ways, there is no a priori reason to start with the
particular framing of the organisers/designers and their clients rather than with
another. A second example is the relative optimism that consensus/a stable socio-
technical system can be achieved, where in practice different groups of stakeholders
may have fundamental disagreements or value conflicts that cannot be reconciled.
While unfortunate, these shared challenges do mean that there are opportunities for
procedural ethicists and designers to exchange insights and draw inspiration from
each other’s approaches to those problems.
General Conclusion and Recommendations
Hidden Design is an interesting attempt to circumvent some of the practical
problems of deliberative stakeholder involvement, but ethical questions have been
raised about its deceptive observation/action approach. In this paper I have drawn
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Table 1 Measures to make design methods such as Hidden Design ethically acceptable
Measures Reason
Concerning uninformed participants
Are the observations made in a public place in
which people know they may be observed?
Uninformed participants may not be exposed to
risks, harms or privacy violations greater than
those they voluntarily expose themselves to in
daily life (Obtaining hypothetical consent)
Is data gathered from participants treated so that it
cannot be used for personal identification or
harm?
Respect for privacy
Is privacy and personal wellbeing of the
participants respected?
Uninformed participants may not be exposed to
risks, harms or privacy violations greater than
those they voluntarily expose themselves to in
daily life (Obtaining hypothetical consent)
If the project takes place in a different cultural
context than that from which the researchers
come, are representatives of local cultural groups
consulted whether the research might cause
distress?
Partly compensates for lack of informed consent
(informed consent by proxy)
Concerning deception
Have other design methods without deception been
tried first and found unsuccessful, or otherwise
judged infeasible?
Deception is hardly a ‘healthy’ base for the design
field and can lead to a general mistrust in
designers
Is it reasonable to expect that the experiment will
lead to significant added (societal) value?
The value of the end matters for the justification of
the means
Do those who run risks/harms during the
experiments benefit proportionately from it?
Requirement of distributive justice
Has an appropriate risk management and harm
mitigation strategy been developed?
Risks imposed on people without their consent
should be minimised and any harm mitigated or
compensated for by the imposing party
(Obtaining hypothetical consent)
Is it reasonable to expect that the experiment will
cause no physical pain or serious emotional
distress?
It is impermissible for an experiment to cause
physical pain or serious emotional distress
Has the proposed experiment been reviewed by an
independent expert?
An impartial assessment of the (ethical) quality of
the experiment helps to avoid conflicts of interest
Is a debriefing organised after the experiment has
finished, regardless of whether the experiment is
successful?
Taking away uncertainty or misguided ideas about
the experiment; giving participants the feeling
that they have contributed to something useful;
check for distress among participants; allow
participants to withdraw their data from the
records (informed consent regarding data use)
Concerning procedure
Can the values embodied in the prototype (problem
framing) be justified?
Problem framing should be supported by reasons
and open for challenge from stakeholders
Is the technology as inclusive as possible/are there
no social or technical structures in place that
exclude stakeholders from interacting with the
design?
No stakeholders should be excluded from
participating in the design procedure
Are the effects of interacting with the design
prototype generally reversible?
Each stakeholder should be able to challenge each
design decision
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on a number of resources to ethically evaluate Hidden Design. If we regard design
as similar to a psychological experiment, one of the main lessons is that it is
generally acceptable to keep its experimental nature from the participants, as long as
the experiment would not expose them to risks that they would not knowingly take
in real-life situations. Deception should never be a first option, and its possible
effects on (public perception of) designers as professionals and design as a practice
should be carefully considered before implementing it.
If we regard design as a possible way of settling affairs within a community,
Hidden Design has some advantages over deliberation, such as evading pressure
from interest groups, a greater possible inclusiveness and using observations of
actions as predictors of future actions, rather than people’s statements about what
their future actions will be. One possible disadvantage is that deliberation can
explore many different and mutually exclusive possibilities, whereas the actions of
some may constrain the action possibilities of others, sometimes permanently. Thus,
Hidden Design may not be suitable for all kinds of situations, especially where
initial choices and actions will severely constrain later action possibilities. A
structured overview of the measures that need to be taken to make design methods
such as Hidden Design ethically acceptable can be found in Table 1.
A final caveat: this disadvantage runs deeper than just constraining design:
designers who participate in Hidden Design already presuppose that the problem they
plan to tackle is the absence of a (or presence of an undesired) socio-technical
system, and the solution is a new or improved socio-technical system. These
presuppositions may not be shared by everyone in the community, however: some
groups might not even consider there to be a problem and other groups might
recognise the problem but assume that legal/social changes, not new innovations, are
necessary to solve it. Indeed, it has been argued that technology designers often over-
attend to technology and under-attend to process, social structures, etc., not only by
virtue of their profession, but also because of the demands of investors, research
projects with pre-defined ‘deliverables’ and other social structures that equate
‘success’ with ‘working product’ (Nieusma and Riley 2010). Thus, different problem
framings may suggest different technological designs, but also non-technological
solutions. Again, this means that people might have a wide range of reasons not to
interact with a certain system, and designers would do well to be aware of that.
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